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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Synergy Worldwide Inc. and Nature's Sunshine Products, Inc. respectfully urge this
Court to find that the economic loss doctrine does not bar a ciaim for fraud-in-theinducement of a contract. As discussed in our opening brief, fraud-in-the-inducement is a
recognized exception to the economic loss rule because it is an intentional tort that occurs
prior to the formation of any contract, which arises from an independent duty - namely,
the duty to be honest and to candidly disclose facts basic to the transaction. Numerous
Utah federal and state court decisions have recognized fraud as an exception to the
economic loss rule, and this Court should adopt their reasoned analysis.
Although Healthbanc International, LLC ("Healthbanc") has correctly outlined the
history of the economic loss rule in its opening brief, it errs in its legal analysis of the
United States District Court's certified question. In particular, Healthbanc relies primarily
upon cases in which a party has alleged only negligence - not intentional misconduct that
induced the very formation of the contract in the first instance. Healthbanc also relies upon
parol evidence cases, which simply are not applicable to this claim.

Accordingly,

Healthbanc's collection of cases do not meaningfully assist the Court in analyzing the
defendant's duty when fraud-in-the-inducement has been alleged.
Moreover, contract law does not adequately protect parties who have been
defrauded into entering into a contractual relationship as Healthbanc contends. Although
Healthbanc correctly notes that contract law is designed to allocate risk among consenting
parties, it ignores the fact that defrauded parties would have never entered into the
contractual relationship in the absence of a defendant's intentional misconduct. Thus, the
1
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traditional policies that protect contracting parties are not present in a fraud-in-theinducement case, as the unknowing party is prevented from understanding the true facts
and information needed to fairly negotiate its risk, duties, and protections.
Finally, Healthbanc's application of these legal principles to the underlying case is
flawed. Contrary to Healthbanc's assertions, Synergy's alternative claim for fraud-in-theinducement is not based upon a representation and warranty provision in the parties'
contract, but instead, is based upon a series of pre-contractual misrepresentations that were
made by both Healthbanc and its principal, Bernard Feldman, prior to the formulation of
the contract. The trial court correctly recognized the factual differences between Synergy's
claim for fraud-in-the-inducement (which alleges a breach of a common law tort duty) and
Healthbanc' s claim for "fraud-in-the-performance" (which was based solely upon duties
originating in the contract). Accordingly, Healthbanc's attempt to reframe the certified

~

question and its criticisms of the trial court's prior rulings do not contribute to this Court's
analysis of the economic loss doctrine.
<tw

For these reasons, Synergy and Nature's Sunshine submit that the Court should
answer the United States District Court's certified question in the negative, because fraudin-the-inducement is an intentional tort that arises out of the breach of an independent duty.
ARGUMENT

In its opening brief, Healthbanc makes four arguments: ( 1) that the economic loss
rule prevents any suit in tort when there is a contract pertaining to the "subject matter" of
the suit; (2) that exempting misrepresentation claims would "weaken bedrock contract
concepts"; (3) that contract law provides an adequate remedy; and (4) that the economic

2
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'1)

loss doctrine applies equally and protects both parties in the context of this case. See
Healthbanc Opening Brief at 12, 18, 21, 22. Each of these arguments is flawed in one or
more respects.

I.

The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Prevent a Suit for Intentional Misconduct
Committed Prior to the Formation of the Contract.

Healthbanc broadly argues in its opening brief that the economic loss rule prevents
any suit in tort when there is a contract pertaining to the "subject matter" of the suit. See
Healthbanc Opening Brief at 12. This argument is incorrect for multiple reasons.
To begin with, Healthbanc's blanket statement proves too much. If the only issue
the Court must decide to determine whether the economic loss rule applies is whether a
contract relates to the subject matter of the dispute, then there could never be a claim for
fraud-in-the-inducement of a contract under Utah law, as procurement of a contract is an
element of the claim. In other words, there will always be a contract "covering the subject
matter of the dispute" in a case alleging fraud-in-the-inducement because the plaintiff's
entire claim is based upon the fraudulent procurement of the contract.

Thus, if

Healthbanc's general statement is adopted as the rule of law, then this Court would
essentially be doing away with the tort. This would require this Court to revisit numerous
prior decisions that acknowledge fraud-in-the inducement as a viable claim. 1 Synergy and
Nature's Sunshine respectfully submit that this is not the current state of Utah law.

1

See, e.g., Motter v. Bateman, 423 P.2d 153 (Utah 1967); Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth
Corp., 2009 UT 2, ilil 52-63, 201 P.3d 966; Keith v. Mt. Resorts Dev., L.L.C., 2014 UT
32, ,i,i 40-43, 337 P.3d 213.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

More importantly, Healthbanc's brief overstates this Court's pnor holdings.
Although it is true that "[t]he economic loss rule prevents recovery of economic damages
under a theory of nonintentional tort when a contract covers the subject matter of the
dispute," this rule does not appear to have been extended to intentional torts as Healthbanc
advocates. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45,

,r 20 (emphasis added).

To the contrary,

this Court has previously recognized that a plaintiff "may recover purely economic losses
in cases involving intentional torts such as fraud, business disparagement, and intentional
interference with contract."

SME Industries v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and

Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54,

,r 32 n.8, 28

P.3d 669 (citing American Towers Owners

Assn's Inc. v. CCI. Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 n.11 (Utah 1996)). Likewise, the
very case that prompted certification of this matter, Donner v. Nicklaus, noted that "[t]he
economic

loss doctrine does not

affect

. . . claims

involving intentional

misrepresentations." 778 F.3d 857,876 n.9 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing SME Industries, 2001
UT 54, ,r 32 n.8).
The primary case that Healthbanc relies on for its proposition, Reighard v. Yates,
only alleged claims for negligence, as opposed to fraud or other intentional misconduct.
See 2012 UT 45,

,r

6 (acknowledging that plaintiffs claims were for negligent

misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract). This same case further recognized
that the economic loss rule would not apply to a tort claim that was based upon an
~

independent duty of care, stating:
The independent duty principle is a means of measuring the reach of the
economic loss rule. When a duty exists that does not overlap with those
contemplated in a contract, "the economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim
4
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~

'because the claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and
thus does not fall within the scope of the rule."'
Id. iJ 21 (quoting Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, iJ 17) (quoting Town of Alma v. Azco
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000)).
In other contexts, this Court has distinguished between intentional and negligent
misconduct, and has expressed its willingness to find that an independent duty exists when
a defendant commits an intentional act. See B.R. v. West, 2012 UT 11, iJ 7,275 P.3d 228.
For example, this Court has previously held:
The long-recognized distinction between acts and om1ss10ns-or
misfeasance and nonfeasance-makes a critical difference and is perhaps the
most fundamental factor courts consider when evaluating duty. Acts of
misfeasance or "active misconduct working positive injury to others,"
typically carry a duty of care. Nonfeasance-"passive inaction, a failure to
take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created
by any wrongful act of the defendant"-by contrast, generally implicates a
duty only in case of special relationship.
Id. (citing Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217, 219). 2 The Utah legislature has also codified this same distinction
with regard to construction contracts, by providing that the presence of a contract does not
prevent a person from simultaneously bringing a claim "based on an intentional or willful
breach of duty existing in law." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513.

(ij

2

The West decision identified five factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff: "(1) whether the defendant's allegedly
tortious conduct consists of an affirmative act or merely an omission ... ; (2) the legal
relationship of the parties ... ; (3) the foreseeability of injury ... ; (4) public policy as to
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury ... ; and (5) other general
policy considerations." Id. iJ 5 (internal citations omitted).
5
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The cases cited in Synergy and Nature's Sunshine's opening brief acknowledge this
critical distinction and have correctly concluded that the economic loss doctrine does not
bar tort claims that are based upon intentional misrepresentations, because the wrongful
conduct precedes the formation of the contract and arises out of the breach of an
independent duty of care - namely, the duty to be honest in commercial dealings and to
truthfully represent facts basic to the transaction. 3 This Court should adopt those reasoned
decisions.

II.

Healthbanc's Parol Evidence Cases Do Not Meaningfully Assist the Court in
Analyzing a Fraud-in-the-Inducement Claim.

In its opening brief, Healthbanc argues that this Court should not recognize an
exception for fraud-in-the-inducement claims because doing so would purportedly
"weaken bedrock contract concepts." See Healthbanc Opening Brief at 18. In support of
this argument, Healthbanc relies upon a group of parol evidence cases which support the
proposition that when a contract has been reduced to writing, all prior discussions and
agreements merge into the fully-integrated contract. Healthbanc's argument is inapposite.
The fundamental premise underlying the parol evidence rule is that a party should
not be permitted to introduce extraneous evidence to contradict the plain language of a
fully integrated contract. See, e.g., Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r,r 11-

3

See, e.g., United Intern Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227
(10th Cir. 2000); BigPayout, LLC v. Mantex Enterprises, Ltd., No. 2:12-cv-1183-RJS,
2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 146699, at *12 (D. Utah October 14, 2014); DeMarco v. LaPay. No.
2:09-cv-190-TS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 117462 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2012); MP Nexlevel,
LLC v. Codale Elec. Supply, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-727-CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40828, at
*15 (D. Utah 2010); see also Restatement (Second) Torts§ 551.
6
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~

12. The cases cited by Healthbanc involve situations in which the parties agree that there
is a contract, but disagree as to what the terms of the contract are or what certain provisions
in their agreement mean. In other words, parol evidence cases analyze situations in which
the parties remain in a voluntary, consensual commercial relationship (although they may
disagree as to the scope or terms of that relationship).
Fraudulent inducement claims, however, are quite different.

In a fraudulent

inducement case, the plaintiff is alleging that there should have never been a contract in
the first instance, and that the relationship was only procured by the defendant's fraud.
Thus, when fraud-in-the-inducement has occurred, the plaintiff has not voluntarily entered
into the relationship based upon good faith negotiations, but instead, was deceived into
entering into the contract through intentional misconduct. In these types of cases, the
plaintiff is not seeking to "modify," "amend," or "supplement" the contract through
extraneous evidence; rather, it is seeking relief from an agreement it would not have entered
into absent fraud. 4

4

In Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT 13, 325 P.3d 70, this Court
held that an allegation that a contract was entered into fraudulently is sufficient to render
the forum selection clause unenforceable. Otherwise, this Court reasoned, "the district
court must accept as valid a provision in a contract despite the plaintiffs contention that
the entire contract was induced by fraud." Id. ,r 52. In other words, one provision (the
forum selection clause) cannot mysteriously survive a global claim for fraud: The entire
contract, when fraudulently induced, is vitiated. See Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485,
499-500 (Utah 1917) ("It has been considered an elementary proposition that fraud
vitiated all contracts when established, and that any one induced to make a contract by
false representations could be relieved from the burden thereof by a court of equity.").

7
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The parol evidence cases cited by Healthbanc do not involve claims for fraud-inthe-inducement of a contract and do not meaningfully assist the Court in analyzing the
issue at hand. The primary case relied upon by Healthbanc to support this argument,
KeyBank National Association v. Systems West Computer Resources, Inc., 2011 UT App
441, 265 P.3d 107, does not even involve an intentional tort, but instead, affirmed the
dismissal of a claim for negligent misrepresentation based upon inadequate briefing. Id. ,r
30.

The other case discussed by Healthbanc, Wardley Corporation v. Meredith

Corporation, 93 Fed. App'x. 183 (10th Cir. 2004), does not meaningfully discuss the
economic loss rule, but instead, summarily dismissed a negligent misrepresentation and

6t;

fraud claim due to the plaintiffs failure to establish reasonable reliance. Id. at *186-87.
Neither case contributes to this Court's analysis of the underlying legal principles at issue
Ci;

in this case.
In any event, even if the Court were to find Healthbanc's parol evidence theory
persuasive, it would not dispose of the issues in this case. Utah law recognizes that "parol

(&w

evidence is always admissible to show fraud, even though it has the effect of varying the
terms of written contract."

Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 153 (Utah 1951)

(emphasis added) (citing Riverside Rancho Corp. v. Cowen, 88 Cal. App. 2d 197 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948); Lufty v. R. D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495 (Ariz. 1941)). 5

See also Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 15 (extrinsic evidence is
admissible to support the argument that an integrated contract is void due to fraud; a
written contract may purport to be the complete understanding of the parties but still be
invalid due to fraud.)
5
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Accordingly, parties are permitted to seek reformation or rescission of a contract that is
procured by fraud, and to introduce parol evidence to support those claims. Healthbanc
offers no law or analysis that would reconcile this body of case law with its proposed rule
oflaw.

III.
f.;jp

Contract Law Does Not Adequately Protect the Parties in a Case of Fraud-inthe-Inducement.

Healthbanc has also argued that fraudulent inducement claims should be subject to
the economic loss doctrine because contract law provides for adequate remedies and
protections. See Opening Brief at 21. This argument is incorrect for multiple reasons.
First, contract law does not adequately protect parties who have been defrauded into
entering into a contractual relationship as Healthbanc contends. Although Healthbanc
correctly notes that contract law is designed to allocate risk among consenting parties, it
ignores the fact that a defrauded party would have never entered into the contractual
relationship on the same terms - if at all - but for the defendant's intentional misconduct.
Thus, the traditional policies that protect contracting parties are not present in a fraud-inthe-inducement case, as an unknowing party is prevented from understanding the true facts
and information needed to fairly negotiate its risk, duties, and protections. See Preventive
Energy Solutions, No. 2:16-cv-809-PMW, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4195 (D. Utah Jan. 10,
2017), at * 19-20 (fraud-in-the-inducement lies outside the scope of the economic loss
doctrine because the plaintiff is "brought to the bargaining table under false pretenses"

9
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which prevents the plaintiff from intelligently negotiating or allocating its risks) (citing
West v. InterFinancial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, il 10). 6
Second, tort law affords additional remedies to the parties that would not be
available in contract, including the possibility of punitive damages, should a jury determine
that exemplary damages are justified. In this case, tort law also affords the only remedy
that Synergy has against Bernard Feldman, Healthbanc's principal, who made each of the
false statements but did not sign the parties' contract. Healthbanc' s reasoning would not
only deprive potential fraud victims of their avenues for full recovery, but would also
reward the tortfeasor by allowing him to limit his liability through a contract procured by
its own fraud.
Third, Healthbanc ignores the high burden of proof that is applicable to a fraud-inthe-inducement claim. As the Court is aware, Utah law requires the plaintiff to prove fraud
by clear and convincing evidence, which suggests that the claim is only likely to succeed
in cases where there is credible evidence supporting the fraud.

This Court's

acknowledgement that a prospective plaintiff may be permitted to proceed on a fraud-inthe-inducement claim without running afoul of the economic loss rule would not alter the
standard of proof in any manner, nor would it affect the defendant's right to defend against

6

See also Associated Diving & Marine Contrs. v. Granite Constr. Co, No. 2:01 CV330
DB, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21560, at *21 (D. Utah July 11, 2003) ("A claim for fraud in
the inducement cannot be barred by the economic loss doctrine" because it is-committed
before the contract is entered into and "the doctrine only applies to bar tort claims that
fall within the bargained-for duties and liabilities of a contract.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).

10
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~

the claim. Indeed, a defendant may very well wish to introduce the contract as evidence to
rebut a fraud claim, whether it be to challenge the materiality of representation, a plaintiffs
lack of reliance, or other elements of the claim. There is nothing unfair about allowing a
plaintiff who meets its heavy burden of proving a fraud claim to obtain its full recovery.
Finally, allowing for tort recovery does not automatically equate to a windfall as
Healthbanc suggests. Although a party may be able to proceed simultaneously on both
fraud and contract theories in certain circumstances, that does not mean that the law will
allow for double recovery. Rather, the trial court would still be obligated to structure its
~

special verdict form appropriately, as well as to reduce and/ or offset any damages awarded
by a jury to eliminate duplicate recovery.
In short, recognizing an exception for fraudulent inducement claims will not
unfairly penalize a tortfeasor, as the law provides adequate protection by requiring a high
standard of proof and reasonable limits on recovery. The tortfeasor should not, however,

GD

be permitted to contract away his liability for intentional misconduct by bringing a party
to the bargaining table under false pretenses.

IV.

The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Economic Loss Doctrine in the
Context of this Case.
Finally, Healthbanc has argued that the economic loss rule should be applied to

Synergy's counterclaim for fraud-in-the-inducement because the trial court previously
dismissed Healthbanc's fraud claim under this doctrine. See Healthbanc Opening Brief at
22-23. Healthbanc' s reasoning is misguided.

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Synergy and Nature's Sunshine acknowledge that it may be somewhat difficult for
this Court to evaluate this particular argument since the Court only receives limited facts
in conjunction with its review of a certified question. However, when placed in context, it
is clear that the trial court not only appreciated the significant factual differences between
Synergy and Healthbanc's respective fraud claims, but also correctly applied the economic
loss doctrine in analyzing the two competing claims.
As discussed previously, Synergy's counterclaim asserted an alternative claim for
fraud-in-the-inducement, which alleged that Healthbanc and its principal made certain
untrue, pre-contractual statements regarding Healthbanc's: (i) alleged ownership of the
Greens formula; (ii) exclusive rights to the formula; (iii) intellectual property rights that
purportedly accompanied the formula; and (iv) scientific backing that purportedly
validated various health benefits associated with the product. (R. 327-29).

Synergy

Gil

alleges that these pre-contractual statements were false, and that it would not have entered
into the Royalty Agreement on the same terms, if at all, but for Healthbanc's
~

misrepresentations. Id. Synergy has asked the Court to award damages to compensate it
for the excess royalties that were paid as a result of Synergy's misrepresentations, which
have been calculated by an expert witness whose opinion will be disclosed in accordance
with applicable discovery deadlines. Alternatively, Synergy has also sought rescission of
the parties' agreement and a refund of the amounts it paid based upon the misrepresented
facts. (R. 330). The trial court accepted Synergy's allegations as true - as it is required to
do when evaluating a motion to dismiss - but certified the present question to this Court to
Gw
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obtain clarification as to whether the economic loss rule would bar a fraud-in-theinducement claim in light of the parties' subsequent contract.
Healthbanc's fraud claim was a completely different animal. Unlike Synergy's
claim (which alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations), Healthbanc's fraud claim
alleged that the defendants committed fraud after the contract was formed by failing to
make certain payments and failing to disclose certain accounting information related to
~

those payments. (R. 215). In other words, Healthbanc' s fraud claim was framed as a
"fraud-in-the-performance" of the agreement since it accused the defendants of
intentionally and willfully breaching their duties to provide information that was
purportedly required to be provided under the parties' contract. (R. at 212-15)
Critically, Healthbanc never cited any common law duty or statute that required
Synergy to provide the information that Healthbanc claimed the defendants had improperly
withheld. Rather, Healthbanc was looking to the Royalty Agreement as the sole source of
the defendants' duty.

Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly dismissed

Healthbanc's fraud claim because Healthbanc could not identify any independent duty to
report royalty calculations or pay royalties beyond those set forth in the contract. (R. at
303)
The trial court's ruling represents the correct application of the economic loss
doctrine and is consistent with the Utah authorities discussed in the parties' briefing. As
both parties acknowledge, Utah law has traditionally required the trial court to look to the
"source of the parties' duty" when evaluating the economic loss doctrine, allowing tort
claims to proceed only when they arise from an independent duty of care. See Hermansen
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v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ,r 16. Here, Synergy's fraud-in-the-inducement claim arises from
the breach of a common law duty - namely, the duty to be honest and to candidly represent
facts basic to the transaction in commercial dealings, as recognized by Section 551 of the
Restatement. Healthbanc's fraud-in-the-performance claim, in contrast, was never based

~

upon any duty imposed by society, but rather, arose strictly out of the parties' contract.
The economic loss doctrine bars tort claims that are based solely upon the breach of
contract; it does not, however, bar a claim that is based upon an intentional and precontractual breach of a common law duty of care.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed herein, Synergy and Nature's Sunshine respectfully
submit that the Court should answer the United States District Court's certified question as
follows:
Does the economic loss rule bar a cause of action for fraudulent inducement
that is based on pre-contract misrepresentations that induce another party
into entering into a contract?
iv
ANSWER: No. The economic loss rule does not bar a cause of action for
fraudulent inducement because the tort is committed prior to the formation
of a contract and there is an independent duty of care to refrain from making
fraudulent misrepresentations in commercial dealings.

~
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DATED this 16th day of March, 2018.
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
Isl Chris Martinez
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